EPIC Statement on Vice President's Key Escrow Letter
 
 
	News reports that the Clinton Administration has reversed 
itself on encryption policy are not supported by the letter from 
Vice President Gore to Rep. Maria Cantwell regarding export 
control policy.  In fact, the letter reiterates the White House's 
commitment to the NSA's key escrow proposal and calls on the 
private sector to develop products that will facilitate electronic 
surveillance.
 
	The letter from the Vice President calls on the government 
and industry to develop jointly systems for key escrow 
cryptography.  Key escrow is the central feature of the Clipper 
chip and the NSA's recommended method for electronic surveillance 
of digital communications. 
 
	The letter also reaffirms the Administration's support for 
Clipper Chip as the federal standard for voice networks. There is 
no indication that the White House will withdraw this proposal.  
Statements that Clipper is "dead" are absurd.
 
	The Gore letter offers no changes in export control policy.  
It recommends instead that the status quo be maintained and that 
more studies be conducted.   (The White House already completed 
such a study earlier this year.  The results were never disclosed 
to the public, despite EPIC's request for release of the findings 
under the Freedom of Information Act.)
 
	This is a significant setback for groups expecting that 
export control laws would be revised this year.
 
	The White House expresses a willingness to allow unclassified 
algorithms and to hold key escrow agents liable for misuse.  These 
are the only provisions of the Gore letter favorable to the user 
community.  But neither provision would even be necessary if the 
White House did not attempt to regulate cryptography in the first 
place.
 
	The Administration's willingness to accept private sector 
alternatives to Clipper for data networks essentially ratifies an 
agreement to develop "wiretap ready" technologies for data 
networks.  
 
	 We believe the letter from the Vice President is essentially 
a blueprint for electronic surveillance of digital networks.  The 
government will set out the requirements for surveillance systems 
such as key escrow, and the industry will build complying systems.  
 
	The plan dovetails neatly with the FBI's Digital Telephony 
proposal, which will establish legal penalties for companies and 
users that design systems that cannot be wiretapped.
 
	We do not believe this is in the interests of users of the 
information highway.  Key escrow necessarily weakens the security 
and privacy of electronic communications.  It makes networks 
vulnerable to tampering and confidential messages subject to 
compromise.  It is the approach urged by organizations that 
specialize in electronic eavesdropping.  No group of Internet 
users has ever called for key escrow encryption.
 
	If this proposal goes forward, electronic surveillance will 
almost certainly increase, network security will be weakened, and 
people who design strong cryptography without key escrow could 
become criminals.  This is not a victory for freedom or privacy.
 
	We support unclassified standards and relaxation of export 
controls.  We cannot support the premise that the government and 
industry should design key escrow systems.  We also do not believe 
that Clipper is an appropriate standard for federal voice 
communications.
 
	We are asking the Vice President to reconsider his position 
and urging network users to make known their concerns about the 
proposal.
 
 
Electronic Privacy Information Center
Washington, DC
July 21, 1994
 

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