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          THE STATE EX REL. BEACON JOURNAL PUBLISHING COMPANY ET AL.,
                APPELLEES, v. CITY OF AKRON ET AL., APPELLANTS.
 
 
              State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. Akron
 
                                  No. 93-2012
 
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
 
                    70 Ohio St. 3d 605; 1994 Ohio LEXIS 2407
 
 
                           May 10, 1994, Submitted  
                           October 26, 1994, Decided
 
 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Summit County, No. 15872.
 
 Appellee Beacon Journal Publishing Company ("ABJ") publishes the 
newspaper known as The Akron Beacon Journal. Appellee Robert 
Paynter is a project editor and employee of ABJ. Appellant Linda 
Sowa was the finance director of the appellant city of Akron.
 
 ABJ and Paynter asked the city and Sowa to provide them with 
computer tape records of the city's year-end employee master files 
for the years 1990 and 1991 pursuant to R.C. 149.43, Ohio's public 
records statute. These payroll files contain various information 
including employees' names, addresses, telephone numbers, Social 
Security numbers ("SSNs"), birth dates, education, employment 
status and positions, pay rates, service ratings, annual and sick 
leave information, overtime hours and pay, and year-to-date 
employee earnings. The city has approximately two thousand five 
hundred employees. Thirteen employees have access to the 
computerized employee master payroll file.
 
 Sowa and the city provided copies of these records with the SSNs 
deleted. ABJ and Paynter then  requested a copy of the same 
records complete with SSNs. Sowa and the city refused to disclose the 
employees' SSNs.
 
 In August 1992, ABJ and Paynter filed a complaint in mandamus in 
the Court of Appeals for Summit County against Sowa and Akron, 
alleging that, pursuant to R.C. 149.43, they were entitled to 
obtain the payroll records complete with SSNs. Sowa and the city 
denied the existence of this obligation, alleging that SSNs are 
not "records" as that term is defined in R.C. 149.011(G), and that 
disclosure of employees' SSNs would violate the employees' right 
to privacy.
 
 The court of appeals granted the petition for mandamus. The 
appellate court found that SSNs are public records for purposes of 
R.C. 149.43, and that their disclosure would not violate the right 
to privacy. This cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of 
right. 
 
Judgment reversed.
 
 
COUNSEL: Roetzel & Andress, Ronald S. Kopp and Amie L. Bruggeman, 
for appellees.
 
Max Rothal, Director of Law, and Deborah M. Forfia, Assistant 
Director of Law, for appellants.
 
Paul R.Q. Wolfson and   David C. Vladeck, urging reversal 
for amicus curiae, Public Citizen Litigation Group.
 
Marc Rotenberg and David L. Sobel, urging reversal for amicus 
curiae, Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility.
 
PFEIFER, MOYER, A.W. SWEENEY, SHAW, DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. 
SWEENEY
 
PFEIFER, J. We are asked to determine whether 
the city is obligated to provide the ABJ with the SSNs of 
approximately two thousand five hundred city employees pursuant to 
Ohio's public records statute. For the following reasons, we find 
that disclosure of this information is not required.
 
   I.
 
   The city and Sowa contend that they are not obligated to 
provide the SSNs because they are not "records" for purposes of 
the Public Records Act. We disagree.
 
   When "information in question is not a record, it is not a 
public record subject to disclosure under R.C. 149.43." State ex 
rel. Fant v. Mengel (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 455, 584 N.E.2d 664, 
665. R.C. 149.011 broadly defines "records." This definition is to 
be given an expansive rather than a restrictive construction. 
State ex rel. Cincinnati Post v. Schweikert (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 
170, 527 N.E.2d 1230. R.C. 149.011 provides the 
following:
 
   "As used in this chapter:
 
   "* * *
 
   "(G) 'Records' includes any document, device, or item, 
regardless of physical form or characteristic, created or received 
by or coming under the jurisdiction of any public office of the 
state or its political subdivisions, which serves to document the 
organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, 
operations, or other activities of the office."
 
   The city has stipulated that its computerized year-end employee 
master payroll files contain the SSNs of all of its employees. The 
city uses the SSNs as taxpayer identification numbers in these 
files. This use of the SSN by the city leads us to conclude that 
it is a "device * * * received by * * * political subdivisions, 
which serves to document organization, functions, [and] operations 
* * * of the office." Thus, the Social Security numbers of the 
city's employees are "records" for the purposes of the Public 
Records Act.
 
  II.
 
   We must next determine whether SSNs, while being "records," are 
also "public records" for purposes of the Public Records Act. For 
the following reasons, we conclude that they are not public 
records.
 
   To compel the city to disclose the SSNs of its 
employees, the ABJ must prove that they are public records. R.C. 
149.43(A) defines "public records," as follows:
 
   "As used in this section:
 
   "(1) 'Public record' means any record that is kept by any 
public office, including, but not limited to, state, county, city, 
village, township, and school district units, except medical 
records, records pertaining to adoption, probation, and parole 
proceedings, records pertaining to actions under section 2151.85 
of the Revised Code and to appeals of actions arising under that 
section, records listed in division (A) of section 3107.42 of the 
Revised Code, trial preparation records, confidential law 
enforcement investigatory records, and records the release of 
which is prohibited by state or federal law. * * *"
 
   Records that are "public records" as defined in R.C. 149.43(A) 
must be disclosed pursuant to R.C. 149.43(B). n1
 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - -
 
    n1 R.C. 149.43(B) provides:
 
   "All public records shall be promptly prepared and made 
available for inspection to any person at all reasonable times 
during regular business hours. Upon request, a person responsible 
for public records shall make copies available at cost, within a 
reasonable period of time. In order to facilitate broader access 
to public records, governmental units shall maintain public 
records in a manner that they can be made available for inspection 
in accordance with this division."
 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - -  
 
   The city and amici contend that disclosure of the SSNs would 
violate the right to privacy of city employees and, thus, is not 
permissible. R.C. 149.43(A) expressly excludes the release of 
records which would violate state or federal law. Because we find 
that the disclosure of the SSNs would violate the federal 
constitutional right to privacy, we find them to be excluded from 
mandatory disclosure. n2
 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - -
 
    n2 Appellants and amici do not contend that disclosure of the 
city employees' SSNs would violate a separate state constitutional 
right to privacy. Thus, that issue is not discussed.
 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - -
 
   "The cases sometimes characterized as protecting 'privacy' have 
in fact involved at least two different kinds of interests. One is 
the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal 
matters, and another is the interest in independence in making 
certain kinds of important decisions." (Footnotes omitted.) Whalen 
v. Roe (1977), 429 U.S. 589, 598-600, 97 S. Ct. 869, 876, 51 L. 
Ed. 2d 64, 73. The first interest is relevant to the 
matter before us.
 
   The right to avoid disclosure of personal matters is so broad 
in scope that it applies to the most public of our public figures. 
Even the President of the  United States possesses this 
right. Nixon v. Admr. of Gen. Serv. (1977), 433 U.S. 425, 457, 97 
S.Ct. 2777, 2797, 53 L. Ed. 2d 867, 900.
 
   In Nixon, the United States Supreme Court discussed the right 
to have personal matters free from disclosure to the public. 
President Nixon sought to prevent the Administrator of the General 
Services Administration from taking custody of an estimated forty-
two million pages of documents and eight hundred eighty tape 
recordings from the Nixon presidency, and promulgating rules for 
eventual public access. Nixon argued, among other things, that the 
Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act ("PRMPA"), 
which prescribes the process by which these documents were to be 
disclosed, violated Nixon's right to privacy. Pursuant to the 
PRMPA, government archivists were entrusted with responsibility of 
preventing confidential and personal matters from being disclosed.
 
   The Nixon  court found that "appellant [Nixon] has a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in his personal communications." 
Id., 433 U.S. at 465, 97 S.Ct. at 2801, 53 L. Ed. 2d at 905. The 
court concluded, however, that this right to privacy was not 
absolute. Instead, the court found that when an individual has an 
interest in avoiding disclosure, that interest must be weighed 
with the government's interest in disclosing the information. "The 
constitutionality of the Act must be viewed in the context of the 
limited intrusion of the screening process, of appellant's status 
as a public figure, of his lack of any expectation of privacy in 
the overwhelming majority of the materials, of the important 
public interest in preservation of the materials, and of the 
virtual impossibility of segregating the small quantity of private 
materials without comprehensive screening. When this is combined 
with the Act's sensitivity to appellant's legitimate privacy 
interests * * *, the unblemished record of the archivists for 
discretion, and the likelihood that the regulations to be 
promulgated by the Administrator will further moot appellant's 
fears that his  materials will be reviewed by 'a host of 
persons,' * * * we are compelled to agree with the District Court 
that appellant's privacy claim is without merit." Id.
 
   Thus, according to the Nixon case, there is a federal right to 
privacy which protects against governmental disclosure of the 
private details of one's life. Nixon, although not dispositive of 
the case before us, sets forth the parameters of the right to 
privacy that we apply to the present case. We must use an analysis 
similar to that used in Nixon to determine whether the right to 
privacy of city employees is invaded when the city reveals their 
SSNs to all inquirers. We must determine whether the city 
employees have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their SSNs 
and then whether their privacy interests outweigh those interests 
benefited by disclosure of the numbers. Slayton v. Willingham 
(C.A.10, 1984), 726 F.2d 631, 635.
 
   A.
 
   Expectation of Privacy
 
   Due to the federal legislative scheme involving the use of 
SSNs, city employees have a legitimate expectation of privacy in 
their SSNs. Uncodified Section 7 of the Privacy Act of 1974 
provides the following:
 
   "(a)(1) It shall be unlawful for any Federal, State 
or local government agency to deny to any individual any right, 
benefit, or privilege provided by law because of such individual's 
refusal to disclose his social security account number.
 
   "* * *
 
   "(b) Any Federal, State, or local government agency which 
requests an individual to disclose his social security account 
number shall inform that individual whether that disclosure is 
mandatory or voluntary, by what statutory or other authority such 
number is solicited, and what uses will be made of it." Section 
552a note (Disclosure of Social Security Number), Title 5, 
U.S.Code, Pub.L. No. 93-579, Section 7, 88 Stat. 1896, 1909.
 
   The purpose of the Privacy Act of 1974 was "to curtail the 
expanding use of social security numbers by federal and local 
agencies and, by so doing, to eliminate the threat to individual 
privacy and confidentiality of information posed by common 
numerical identifiers." Doyle v. Wilson (D.Del.1982), 529 F. Supp. 
1343, 1348.
 
   Congress when enacting the Privacy Act of 1974 was codifying 
the societal perception that SSNs should not to be available to 
all. This legislative scheme is sufficient to create an 
expectation of  privacy in the minds of city employees 
concerning the use and disclosure of their SSNs.
 
   B.
 
   Weighing Interests Benefited by Disclosure Against Privacy 
Interests
 
   Having held that employees of the city have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy regarding the disclosure of their Social 
Security numbers, we must weigh these privacy interests against 
those favoring disclosure.
 
   The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
reviewed a case similar to this one in Greidinger v. Davis (C.A.4, 
1993), 988 F.2d 1344. In Greidinger, the plaintiff challenged 
Virginia voting laws that required citizens to provide their SSNs 
when registering to vote. These SSNs were available to anyone who 
purchased voter registration lists. The state of Virginia claimed 
that the SSNs were necessary to avoid voter fraud. The court of 
appeals held that Virginia's interest in internal use of SSNs did 
not justify disclosure and that other data such as 
voter registration numbers or addresses would provide the state 
with enough information to distinguish voters with the same name.
 
   The appellate court held that the disclosure of this other 
information was less intrusive than the disclosure of 
SSNs. The Greidinger court listed the potential jeopardy that 
voters would be placed in if their Social Security numbers were 
recorded and then unconditionally released:
 
   "Armed with one's SSN, an unscrupulous individual could obtain 
a person's welfare benefits or Social Security benefits, order new 
checks at a new address on that person's checking account, obtain 
credit cards, or even obtain the person's paycheck. * * * 
Succinctly stated, the harm that can be inflicted from the 
disclosure of an SSN to an unscrupulous individual is alarming and 
potentially financially ruinous." Id. at 1353-1354.
 
   After discussing the potential evils created by the release of 
voters' SSNs, the Greidinger court stated:
 
   "Virginia's voter registration form requires a registrant 
things, his name, address, SSN, age, place of birth, and county of 
previous registration. Virginia's interest in preventing voter 
fraud and voter participation could easily be met without the 
disclosure of the SSN and the attendant possibility of a serious 
invasion of privacy that would result from that disclosure. * * * 
Most assuredly, an address or date of birth would sufficiently  
distinguish among voters that shared a common name." Id. 
at 1354-1355.
 
   The case before this court requires analysis similar to that 
used by the Greidinger court. The public's interest in obtaining 
city employees' SSNs must be weighed against the harm caused by 
the invasion of employees' privacy resulting from the release of 
the SSNs.
 
   It is fundamental tenet of democracy that the people, the 
press, and the media be fully informed about the processes of 
their government. As John Adams noted, "liberty cannot be 
preserved without a general knowledge among the people, who have a 
right * * * and a desire to know; but besides this, they have a 
right, an indisputable, unalienable, indefeasible, divine right to 
that most dreaded and envied kind of knowledge, I mean of the 
characters and conduct of their rulers." John Adams, A 
Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law (1765). However, this 
right is by no means boundless or unconditional. See Nixon.
 
   The city's refusal to release its employees' SSNs does not 
significantly interfere with the public's right to monitor 
governmental conduct. The numbers by themselves reveal little 
information about the city's employees. The city 
provided appellees with enormous amounts of other information 
about each city employee; only the SSNs numbers were deleted. 
Employees' addresses, telephone numbers, salaries, level of 
education, and birth dates, among other things,  were 
all provided. The data supplied by the city provides far more 
enlightening information about the composition of the city's 
workforce than would SSNs.
 
   While the release of all city employees' SSNs would provide 
inquirers with little useful information about the organization of 
their government, the release of the numbers could allow an 
inquirer to discover the intimate, personal details of each city 
employee's life, which are completely irrelevant to the operations 
of government. As the Greidinger court warned, a person's SSN is a 
device which can quickly be used by the unscrupulous to acquire a 
tremendous amount of information about a person.
 
   In this case, James E. Young, an employee of the city, 
testified that he objected to the city's release of his SSN 
because of the harm previously caused by the unwarranted release 
of his SSN. Young testified that, in 1989, he and a friend were 
attempting to purchase a rental property. Young was informed 
that he would be denied credit partly because of 
delinquent accounts with retail credit institutions.
 
   Young was notified by the ex-wife of another James E. Young 
("Young 2"), that Young 2 had obtained Young's SSN when Young 2 
requested his own transcript from the University of Akron. The 
university erroneously sent Young 2 the transcript of Young, 
complete with Young's SSN. Young 2, using the improper SSN, opened 
accounts with Firestone, Texaco, Associate Finance and a 
department store in Richmond, Virginia. Apparently, Young 2 had 
used these accounts and was delinquent in paying them. In order to 
rectify his credit record, Young had to pay nearly $ 800 in 
attorney fees. The plight of Young illustrates the ability of a 
pretender using an SSN to assume another's identity. This is 
perhaps the ultimate invasion of one's privacy.
 
   During recent Congressional hearings, journalist Jeffrey 
Rothfeder testified before the House Subcommittee on Social 
Security that, during a journalistic investigation, he was able to 
obtain highly confidential information about then - Vice President 
Dan Quayle with the use of Quayle's SSN. Rothfeder obtained 
Quayle's private Virginia address and the Vice President's   
unlisted phone number. Through this exercise, Rothfeder "wanted to 
show that with privacy at a premium and data banks proliferating 
even the Vice President of the United States is easy pickings for 
somebody with prying eyes." Use of Social Security Number as a 
National Identifier, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Social 
Security of the Committee on Ways and Means, 102d Congress, 1st 
Session, Serial 102-11 (1991) 75.
 
   Thanks to the abundance of data bases in the private sector 
that include the SSNs of persons listed in their files, an 
intruder using an SSN can quietly discover the intimate details of 
a victim's personal life without the victim ever knowing of the 
intrusion.
 
     We find today that the high potential for fraud and 
victimization caused by the unchecked release of city employee 
SSNs outweighs the minimal information about governmental 
processes gained through the release of the SSNs. Our holding is 
not intended to interfere with meritorious investigations 
conducted by the press, but instead is intended to preserve one of 
the fundamental of American constitutional law -- ours is a 
government of limited power. We conclude that the United States 
Constitution forbids disclosure under the circumstances 
of this case. Therefore, reconciling federal constitutional law 
with Ohio's Public Records Act, we conclude that R.C. 149.43 does 
not mandate that the city of Akron disclose the SSNs of all of its 
employees upon demand.
 
   The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed.
 
   Judgment reversed.
 
   MOYER, C.J., A.W. SWEENEY and SHAW, JJ., concur.
 
   DOUGLAS, RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., dissent.
 
   STEPHEN R. SHAW, J., of the Third Appellate District, sitting 
for WRIGHT, J.
 
DOUGLAS, J., dissenting. Jonathan Swift (1667-1745), an 
Eighteenth Century English satirist, poet and Anglican clergyman, 
once said: "Invention is the talent of youth, as judgment is of 
age." International Dictionary of Thoughts (1969) 405. Today, by 
inventing a social security number exception to the Public Records 
Law, R.C. 149.43, a majority of this court has glorified the 
talent of youth -- invention -- and has scorned the talent of age 
-- judgment. Those who would decry judicial activism take heed. 
Today's decision is judicial activism at its best. Being troubled 
that a person's social security number might become the subject of 
public scrutiny (a proposition to which I am not unsympathetic),   
the majority fashions yet another exception to R.C. 
149.43 and concludes that the disclosure of the city of Akron 
employees' social security numbers to appellees would violate the 
employees' constitutional right to privacy. Because there is no 
legal authority for such a holding and, indeed, because the law is 
actually to the contrary, I must respectfully dissent.
 
   In support of its novel proposition, the majority cites no 
section of the Ohio Revised Code. There is good reason for this. 
There is none. The majority does not cite any provision of the 
Ohio Constitution supporting its position. There is good reason 
for this. There is none. The majority does not cite any federal 
statute in support of its holding. Again, there is good reason. 
There is none. No provision of the United States Constitution is 
cited in support. Why? There is none. No case law either federal 
or state of Ohio is given as authority. Why? Same answer -- there 
is none.
 
    Simply put, the majority has concocted an exception 
to R.C. 149.43 that does not, in law, exist. In doing so, the 
majority creates a corresponding right where none presently exists 
under either Ohio or federal law. In the best tradition of Justice  
William O. Douglas's discovery of a "penumbra," in 
Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L. 
Ed. 2d 510, today the majority fabricates a social security 
penumbra from whole cloth.
 
   In support of its position, the majority cites Nixon v. Admr. 
of Gen. Serv. (1977), 433 U.S. 425, 97 S.Ct. 2777, 53 L. Ed. 2d 
867. The majority suggests that Nixon is persuasive authority for 
the majority's holding but then, almost immediately, the majority 
states that Nixon is "* * * not dispositive of the case before us 
* * *." The majority does not tell us how Nixon is "not 
dispositive." The reason for this may be that it is so obviously 
inapplicable.
 
   Nixon involved a complaint filed by the former President in the 
District Court of the District of Columbia, challenging the 
constitutionality of the Presidential Recordings and Materials 
Preservation Act ("Act"). The District Court held that the claims 
set forth by the former President lacked merit and, accordingly, 
dismissed the complaint. The United States Supreme Court affirmed 
the judgment of the district court, holding, among 
other things, that the Act was not an unconstitutional 
infringement on the former President's right of privacy. 
Importantly, the court noted that a "claim of invasion of his 
privacy cannot be considered in the abstract; rather, the claim 
must be considered in light of the specific provisions of the Act, 
and any intrusion must be weighed against the public interest in 
subjecting the Presidential materials of appellant's 
administration to archival screening." Id. at 458, 97 S.Ct. at 
2797-2798, 53 L. Ed. 2d at 900.
 
   From this "not dispositive" holding, the majority forms an 
abstract legal standard, stating that "* * * there is a federal 
right to privacy which protects against governmental disclosure of 
the private details of one's life." This statement by the 
majority, if derived from Nixon, is not just overbroad. It is just 
plain wrong! Nixon involved federal questions, federal 
legislation, and federal officials. The Supreme Court did conclude 
that the former president may have a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in some of his personal communications. Id. at 465, 97 
S.Ct. at 2801, 53 L. Ed. 2d at 905.  However, the Supreme 
Court did not hold in Nixon, nor has it ever held or even implied, 
that an absolute federal right to privacy exists for all 
individuals under all circumstances.
 
   With the "not dispositive" Nixon case lending little or no 
solace or support for its position, the majority then turns for 
help to Section 7 of the Privacy Act of 1974 and concludes that 
the city employees have an expectation of privacy in their social 
security numbers under the Act. This Act provides in relevant part 
that:
 
    "(a)(1) It shall be unlawful for any Federal, State 
or local government agency to deny to any individual any right, 
benefit, or privilege provided by law because of such individual's 
refusal to disclose his social security account number.
 
   "* * *
 
   "(b) Any Federal, State" or local government agency which 
requests an individual to disclose his social security account 
number shall inform that individual whether that disclosure is 
mandatory or voluntary, by what statutory or other authority such 
number is solicited, and what uses will be made of it." (Emphasis 
added.) Section 552a note (Disclosure of Social Security Number), 
Title 5, U.S.Code, Pub.L. 93-579, Section 7, 88 Stat. 
1896, 1909.
 
   The intent of the federal statute is clear. It is apparent, at 
least to me, that this statute has nothing to do with a request by 
a newspaper to obtain records from a municipality. First, the 
Privacy Act of 1974 applies only when an entity requesting the 
information is an instrument of the federal government or the 
individual states. Doyle v. Wilson (D.Del.1982), 529 F. Supp. 
1343, 1348-1349; Am. Fedn. of State, Cty. & Mun. Emp. v. Albany 
(1986), 81 Ore.App. 231, 725 P.2d 381; and Freeman v. Koerner Ford 
of Scranton, Inc. (1987), 370 Pa.Super 150, 536 A.2d 340. Second, 
"the apparent purpose of this section is to define the 
circumstances in which government may require individuals to 
disclose their numbers, to allow individuals to make informed 
choices about whether to disclose their numbers in other 
circumstances and to provide protection for individuals who decide 
not to make voluntary disclosure. Nothing in the act expressly 
prohibits the government from disclosing the numbers once they are 
in its possession" (Emphasis added.) Am. Fedn. of State, 
Cty. & Mun. Emp., supra, 81 Ore.App. at 234, 725 P.2d at 383.
 
   Obviously, the Privacy Act of 1974 does not support the holding 
of the majority, but even if it did, the Act only applies to 
instruments of the federal government or the individual states. 
The Akron Beacon Journal may be a government unto itself. What it 
assuredly is not is an instrument of government.
 
   Notwithstanding this, the majority closes Section A of Part II 
of the opinion with the remarkable statement that "this 
legislative scheme is sufficient to create an expectation of 
privacy in the minds of city employees concerning the use and 
disclosures of their SSNs." Just because one believes or even 
asserts that one has an expectation of privacy in a particular 
circumstance does not make it so in law.
 
   Having concluded Section A of Part II of the opinion as set 
forth above, the majority then moves to Section B, which is titled 
"Weighing Interests Benefited by Disclosure Against Privacy 
Interests." The only citation of authority in Section B is 
Greidinger v. Davis (C.A.4, 1993), 988 F.2d 1344. The majority's 
reliance on Greidinger is equally misplaced.
 
    In Greidinger, the court held that two Virginia 
statutes, which required disclosure of a voter registrant's social 
security number as a condition to the right to vote, created an 
impermissible burden on the exercise of the fundamental right to 
vote. In weighing this burden, the court considered Section 7 of 
the Privacy Act of 1974 (which, as we have seen, is not applicable 
here), and Exemption 6 of the federal Freedom of Information Act 
("FOIA"), Section 552(b)(6), Title 5, U.S.Code. Section 552(b)(6) 
provides that certain personnel and medical files are not subject 
to disclosure if disclosure would "constitute a clearly 
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." The protections 
afforded under the federal Privacy Act of 1974 and FOIA are a 
product of statute, not of federal common-law privacy rights. 
Further, our Ohio statute, R.C. 149.43, does not include an 
exemption from disclosure comparable to that found in Section 
552(b)(6). In any event, Greidinger does not stand for the 
proposition, which was not even mentioned in the opinion, that a 
voter registrant has a constitutional right to privacy.
 
   Further, United States Supreme Court decisions which 
have discussed privacy protections for individuals do not support 
the majority's blanket conclusion that "the disclosure of the SSNs 
would violate the federal constitutional right to privacy." In 
Doyle, supra, the court, after examining various Supreme Court 
decisions and decisions from other courts, concluded that "the 
constitutional right to privacy embodies solely 'those personal 
rights that can be deemed fundamental or implicit in the concept 
of ordered liberty.' * * * The activities ordinarily embraced by 
this definition relate to the intimate facets of an individual's 
personal life, namely, marriage, procreation, contraception, 
family relationships, child rearing or education. * * * The courts 
accordingly have held, and this Court concurs in that view, that 
mandatory disclosure of one's social security number does not so 
threaten the sanctity of individual privacy as to require 
constitutional protection." (Citations omitted and emphasis 
added.) Doyle, supra, 529 F. Supp. at 1348. Indeed, Doyle, which 
the majority cites in support, actually undermines its position. 
Further, see, e.g., Paul v. Davis (1976), 424 U.S. 693, 712-713, 
96 S.Ct. 1155, 1166, 47 L. Ed. 2d 405, 420-421.  
 
   Finding no real support for its holding, the majority then 
moves on in Section B of the opinion and determines that "having 
held that employees of the city have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy regarding the disclosure of their Security numbers, we 
must weigh these privacy interests against those favoring 
disclosure." (Emphasis added.) This determination clearly 
misstates the law. In State ex rel. Toledo Blade Co. v. Univ. of 
Toledo Found (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 258, 266, 602 N.E.2d 1159, 
1164-1165, we held that: "It is the role of the General Assembly 
to balance the competing concerns of the public's right to know 
and individual citizens' right to keep private certain information 
that becomes part of the records of public offices. The General 
Assembly has done so, as shown by  numerous statutory 
exceptions to R.C. 149.43(B), found in both the statute itself and 
in other parts of the Revised Code." (Emphasis added.)
 
   R.C. 149.43 requires that all public records be made available 
to any person. See State ex rel. Steckman v. Jackson (1994), 70 
Ohio St.3d 420, 639 N.E.2d 83. Any exception to this 
rule must be found within the statute itself, which includes an 
exception for those "records the release of which is prohibited by 
state or federal law." R.C. 149.43(A)(1).
 
   As we have seen, there is no federally mandated exception to 
R.C. 149.43. In Ohio, the General Assembly has provided specific 
circumstances where disclosure of certain records is prohibited. 
Examples follow.
 
   R.C. 2505.073 deals with the right of a minor to appeal the 
dismissal, by a juvenile court, of her complaint to have an 
abortion without parental notification. R.C. 2505.073(B) provides 
that:
 
   "All proceedings under division (A) of this section shall be 
conducted in a manner that will preserve the anonymity of the 
appellant on appeal. All papers and records that pertain to an 
appeal under this section shall be kept confidential and are not 
public records under section 149.43 of the Revised Code." 
(Emphasis added.)
 
   R.C. 3701.241 deals with duties of the Director of Health 
related to AIDS and HIV. R.C. 3701.241(A)(7) provides, in part, 
that:
 
   "Information obtained or maintained under the partner 
notification system is not a public record under section 149.43 of 
the Revised Code and may be released  only in accordance 
with division (C) of section 3701.243 of the Revised Code." 
(Emphasis added.)
 
   Specifically, with regard to a person's social security number, 
R.C. 1349.17 restricts the recording of credit card, telephone or 
social security numbers. Subject to certain exceptions found in 
R.C. 1349.17(B), R.C. 1349.17(A)(2) provides that:
 
   "No person shall record or cause to be recorded either of the 
following:
 
   "* * *
 
   "(2) The telephone number or social security account number of 
the other party to a transaction, when payment is made by credit 
card charge agreement, check, bill of exchange, or other draft."
 
   R.C. 4501.15 also restricts disclosure of social security 
numbers. The first sentence of R.C. 4501.15 provides that:
 
   "The department of public safety shall not provide social 
security numbers from its driver license and vehicle registration 
records to any person, except local, state, or federal 
governmental agencies." (Emphasis added.)
 
     Just as significantly, the second sentence of the 
section provides that:
 
   "This section does not preclude the registrar from reporting a 
person's social security number if the number was provided in the 
request for information." (Emphasis added.)
 
   R.C. 742.41 involves, in part, access to records of the Police 
and Firemen's Disability and Pension Fund. R.C. 742.41 provides 
the following:
 
   "(A) As used in this section:
 
   "* * *
 
   "(2) 'Personal history record' includes a member's * * * name, 
address, phone number, social security number * * * and any other 
information deemed confidential by the trustees of the fund.
 
   "(B) * * * The records of the board shall be open for public 
inspection except for the following, which shall be excluded, 
except with the written authorization of the individual concerned:
 
   "(1) The individual's personal history record[.]" (Emphasis 
added.)
 
   Thus, it is clear that if the General Assembly had chosen to 
make a social security number exception to R.C. 149.43, given R.C. 
2505.073(B), 3701.241(A)(7), 1349.17(A)(2), 4501.15, and 
742.41(A)(2) and (B)(1), it certainly knew how to do so. The 
simple fact is that there is no statute which prohibits the 
release of a city employee's social security number. Whatever our 
individual personal preference might be, that preference should 
not be permitted to invade the mandates of the law.
 
   In today's multifarious society, social security numbers have 
become an important means of identification. Our social 
security number in many instances has become our name. It is 
commonplace to be asked to reveal our number, both in the private 
sector and in contacts with the government. For example, the 
average citizen is asked to reveal his or her number on banking 
forms, to cash checks, to apply for loans or credit cards. Job 
application forms request social security numbers. College 
students' grades are often posted by social security number. 
Question No. 1 on the State of Ohio Employees Ohio Med Benefits 
Claim Form is the social security number of the patient-claimant. 
Not until question No. 4 is the patient's name even asked. Blue 
Cross Blue Shield of Ohio Explanation of Benefits Form gives the 
claimant's social security number as "Your identification number." 
The claimant's name follows later on the form. The list is 
endless. We are even required to reveal our numbers when applying 
for a marriage license. R.C. 3101.05; see, also, R.C. 4513.361, 
which prohibits the giving of a false social security number to a 
law enforcement officer who is in the process of issuing a traffic 
ticket or complaint. Does the average citizen really have 
an expectation of privacy in his or her social security 
number as the majority seems to think? The law clearly answers 
that question in the negative.
 
   The fear (and I concede that it is a genuine concern) is that a 
person's social security number in the wrong hands can result in 
criminal conduct. This is true also, of course, of checks, credit 
cards and other instruments that are negotiable. While this is of 
concern, the answer is that criminal conduct should be punished by 
criminal sanctions. Some people drive while intoxicated, but we do 
not, because of this, prohibit everyone from driving. Some people 
shoplift, but we do not close all stores because that is so.
 
   Some members of the majority are fond of saving, when a 
particular issue is presented to the court for decision, that "the 
matter should be left to the legislature." Well, in this case, the 
matter has been left to the legislature and no exception to R.C. 
149.43 for social security numbers has been enacted. Now the 
majority's answer is different. Where the legislature has not 
acted to create an exception, we had better do so! Let the 
judicial activism argument now be put to rest.
 
   In this case, a unanimous court of appeals, Judges Baird,   
Dickinson and Reece, in a well-reasoned opinion n3 held 
that a writ should be granted ordering the release of the 
requested social security numbers. In State ex rel. Lippitt v. 
Kovacic (1991), 70 Ohio App.3d 525, 591 N.E.2d 422, a unanimous 
court of appeals, Judges John V. Corrigan, Krupansky and Patton of 
the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, held that records which 
contained social security numbers were public records and should 
be released upon proper request. In this case, we should follow -- 
others have led.
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- - - - - - -
 
    n3 I do not agree with the decision of the court of appeals to 
deny relators' attorney fees. See State ex rel. Fox v. Cuyahoga 
Cty. Hosp. Sys. (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 108, 112-114, 529 N.E.2d 
443, 447-448 (Douglas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part).
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- - - - - - -
 
   Because the majority's decision is based on personal 
predilections and not the law, I must respectfully dissent. I 
would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals 
granting relators' writ.
 
   RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., concur in the foregoing 
dissenting opinion. 


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