COMMENTS OF THE ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER

to

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Privacy Act of 1974; System of Records

[Docket No. DHS-2017-0038]

October 18, 2017


According to DHS, “the purpose of this system of records is to facilitate administration of benefits and enforcement of provisions under the INA and related immigration statutes . . .” and the system of records is “used primarily by DHS employees for immigration processing and adjudication, protection of national security, and administering and enforcing immigration and nationality laws and related regulations and policy.”³

² Id. at 43,557.
³ Id. at 43,559.
Pursuant to the agency’s request for comments, the Electronic Privacy Information Center (“EPIC”) submit these comments to urge the Department to: (1) withdraw the agency’s proposal to add social media information to an individual’s Alien File (“A-File”); and (2) review the appropriateness of using social media information in the administration of immigration benefits.

I. EPIC’s Interest

EPIC is a public interest research center in Washington, D.C. EPIC was established in 1994 to focus public attention on emerging civil liberties issues and protect privacy, the First Amendment, and constitutional values. EPIC has a particular interest in preserving the right of people to engage in First Amendment protected activities without the threat of government surveillance.

EPIC previously sued the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) to obtain documents related to a DHS social network and media monitoring program. These documents revealed that the agency had paid over $11 million to an outside company, General Dynamics, to engage in monitoring of social networks and media organizations and prepare summary reports for DHS. According to DHS documents, General Dynamics would “monitor public social communications on the Internet,” including the public comments sections of NYT, LA Times, Huff Po, Drudge, Wired’s tech blogs, and ABC News. DHS also requested monitoring of

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7 DHS Social Media Monitoring Documents, supra note 6, at 127, 135, 148, 193.
Wikipedia pages for changes\(^8\) and announced its plans to set up social network profiles to monitor social network users.\(^9\)

DHS required General Dynamics to monitor not just “potential threats and hazards” and “events with operational value,” but also paid the company to “identify[] media reports that reflect adversely on the U.S. Government [or] DHS . . . ”\(^{10}\) The DHS clearly intended to “capture public reaction to major government proposals.”\(^{11}\) DHS instructed the media monitoring company to generate summaries of media “reports on DHS, Components, and other Federal Agencies: positive and negative reports on FEMA, CIA, CBP, ICE, etc. as well as organizations outside the DHS.”\(^{12}\)

The documents obtained by EPIC through its Freedom of Information Act lawsuit led to a Congressional hearing on DHS social network and media monitoring program.\(^{13}\) EPIC submitted a statement for the record for that hearing opposing the agency’s media monitoring and called for the immediate end of the program.\(^{14}\) Members of Congress expressed concern about the federal agency’s plan to monitor social media.\(^{15}\)

Given government misuse of social media monitoring techniques in the past, EPIC is skeptical of DHS’s proposal to add social media information to A-Files for scrutiny by the agency. EPIC opposes this proposal.

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\(^8\) Id. at 124, 191.  
\(^9\) Id. at 128.  
\(^10\) Id. at 51, 195.  
\(^11\) Id. at 116.  
\(^12\) Id. at 183, 198.  
II. The Lack of Transparency Surrounding the Department’s Proposal Increases the Prospect of Abuse, Mission Creep, and Disproportionate Risks for Marginalized Groups

DHS has stated that the agency will now include in A-Files, which are an individual’s official immigration record, “social media handles, aliases, associated identifiable information, and search results.”\(^\text{16}\) Little additional information is provided.

It is not clear how DHS intends to use the social media information. Other federal agencies have a history of using social media for controversial purposes. For example, DHS has monitored social and other media for dissent and criticism of the agency.\(^\text{17}\) Will DHS monitor for similar speech that is critical of U.S. policy? Will mere dissent constitute grounds for denying immigration benefits or labeling an individual a threat to national security or public safety? Who will the social media information be shared with and under what specific circumstances? How will DHS prevent Muslim and Arab Americans from being scrutinized more harshly for exercising their First Amendment rights?

Additionally, what data will the social media information be combined with? Will DHS use the social media information to obtain additional data from social media companies? Will individuals be informed if social media information leads to the denial of benefits?

Answers to these questions should be provided prior to adoption of DHS’s proposal to add social media information to A-Files.

This proposal leaves the door open for abuse, mission creep, and the disproportionate targeting of Muslim and Arab Americans among other groups. The proposal is especially

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\(^\text{16}\) 82 Fed. Reg. at 43,557.
alarming in light of past misuses of social media from all levels of government\(^{18}\) as well as the Trump administration’s controversial travel ban.\(^{19}\) DHS has provided no details of how the agency will tailor the use of social media information to ensure their use does not expand beyond the stated purpose or prevent the targeting of individuals merely engaged in First Amendment protected activities.

III. Indiscriminate Scrutiny of Social Media Accounts Chills First Amendment Protected Activities

DHS’s proposal to collect social media information also implicates the First Amendment and will have a chilling effect on protected speech. Freedom of speech and expression are core civil liberties and have been strongly protected by the Constitution and the U.S. courts.\(^{20}\) These rights extend to non-U.S. citizens.\(^{21}\)

Many people around the world use social media, including Facebook and Twitter, to support democratic movements and to campaign for political reform.\(^{22}\) But these political views

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\(^{20}\) See, e.g., *United States v. Stevens*, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585 (2010) (holding that the “First Amendment itself reflects a judgment by the American people that the benefits of its restrictions on the Government outweigh the costs”); see also *NAACP v. Alabama ex. rel. Patterson*, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (holding that immunity from state scrutiny of membership lists was related to the right of freedom of association and fell under the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution); *City of Los Angeles v. Patel*, 135 S. Ct. 2443 (2015) (holding that a city ordinance that required hotels to make their registries available to the police on demand was unconstitutional under the 4th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution).

\(^{21}\) See David Cole, *Are Foreign Nationals Entitled to the Same Constitutional Rights as Citizens?*, 25 T. Jefferson L. Rev. 367-388 (2003) (“foreign nationals are generally entitled to the equal protection of the laws, to political freedoms of speech and association, and to due process requirements of fair procedure where their lives, liberty, or property are at stake.”).

reflect the specific circumstances of national political systems and regional political conflict, and there is some risk that comments taken out of context could discourage political reform efforts. For example, social media is credited with empowering the Arab Spring and allowing Egyptians to remove former President Hosni Mubarak from power.\textsuperscript{23} Social media also played a pivotal role in the 2013 Gezi Park protests in Turkey and the recent anti-Putin protests in Russia, which were sparked by a blog post and YouTube video.\textsuperscript{24}

DHS wants to obtain social media information for A-Files used in the administration of benefits and the enforcement of immigration-related statutes.\textsuperscript{25} Included under these broad purposes is identifying individuals who pose a national security or public safety threat.\textsuperscript{26} However, the proposal assumes that social media provides an accurate picture of a person and those they are close with. People connect with others on social media for many reasons. An individual’s “friend” on a social media site could range from a close friend to an acquaintance to someone they may never have met. Often individuals connect to people on social media who have completely different perspectives and world views. Furthermore, the proposal fails to state to what extent possible connections will be used in the vetting process and whether the social media accounts of U.S. citizens may be used as part of the vetting process.

The proposal also fails to explain how DHS will use social media as part of the determination of benefits and identifying individuals that pose a national security or public safety

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\textsuperscript{25} 82 Fed. Reg. at 43,559.
\textsuperscript{26} See 82 Fed. Reg. at 43,557.
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threat. Many individuals have been on social media for years and have created a permanent record of their lives. Twenty-seven Teenagers are routinely warned to be careful of what they post on social media," however teenagers as well as adults have made posts on social media which they later regret and may not be an actual reflection of who they are. This should be taken into account when considering whether to use social media information to make any determinations about individuals. Social media does not necessarily reflect who a person truly is and taking posts out of context has the potential to wrongly deny people entry because of an inside joke or posturing that DHS does not understand from viewing certain information in isolation. Furthermore, the proposal runs the risk of making what is not on social media seem suspect. Some individuals may not be active on social media or may not have any social media accounts at all and the Department has failed to say what impact, if any, this may have when reviewing an individual’s file.

Government programs that threaten important First Amendment rights are immediately suspect and should only be undertaken where the government can demonstrate a compelling interest that cannot be satisfied in other way. Government programs that scrutinize online comments, dissent, and criticism for the purpose of administering immigration benefits sends a

29 Alyssa Giacobbe, 6 ways social media can ruin your life, BOSTON GLOBE, May 21, 2014, https://www.bostonglobe.com/magazine/2014/05/21/ways-social-media-can-ruin-your-life/St8vHIdqCLk7eRsVME3k5K/story.html.
chilling message to all users of social media—which increasingly provides important forums to share ideas, engage in debates, and explore new ideas.

Concern over how the government uses social media is widespread and several questions remain unanswered. Earlier this year, several members of the House of Representatives sent a letter to Attorney General Jeff Sessions raising concerns about how the federal government and federal law enforcement agencies used technologies that monitored social media. Those Representatives noted how social media was effectively being used to monitor people who were suspected of no wrongdoing in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights stating:

There is evidence that social media data has been used to monitor protests and activists...An investigator at the Oregon Department of Justice used a service called DigitalStakeout to search Twitter for tweets using the hashtag #BlackLivesMatter. On the basis of his tweets – which included political cartoons and commentary but no indications of criminal activity or violence – the Department’s own Director of Civil Rights was deemed a “threat to public safety.”

The same concerns are present in DHS’s current proposal and these concerns must be addressed before any further steps are taken.

IV. The Inclusion for an Individual’s Social Media Information Raises Particular Privacy Concerns

The inclusion of social media information in A-Files raises a related concern – this particular type of personal information is the key that ties together discrete bits of personal data. In the past, the United States has sought to regulate the collection and use of the Social Security Numbers, EPIC, https://epic.org/privacy/ssn/.

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33 Id.
Security Number precisely because of the concern that is leads to government profiling.\textsuperscript{35} The availability of the SSN has been shown to contribute to identity theft and financial fraud.\textsuperscript{36}

A social media identifier is not private in the sense that it is a secret. But the collection of social media information by the government does raise privacy concerns because it enables enhanced profiling and tracking of individuals. Furthermore, an individual has no way of knowing who in the government may be tracking them and for how long that surveillance could continue. What is initially presented as a way to facilitate the administration of immigration benefits can turn into unwarranted, large scale surveillance of innocent people.

For this reason as well, we urge the agency to withdraw the proposal.

\textbf{V. EPIC Recommendations}

The problems with collecting social media information and scrutinizing the social media accounts of persons not suspected of any wrongdoing are significant and far-reaching. DHS has provided little transparency in how the agency plans to use the social media information it collects. Such opaqueness in the DHS proposal provides little comfort that DHS will provide the transparency necessary to ensure that the program is subject to appropriate oversight and accountability.

EPIC urges DHS to withdraw its proposal to include social media information in A-Files. Additionally, EPIC recommends that any current use of social media analysis by DHS should be reviewed to determine whether it is necessary, whether it undermines First Amendment protected


activities, and to determine what safeguards are in place and if the safeguards ensure appropriate oversight and public transparency.

**VI. Conclusion**

The proposal undermines privacy and is contrary to First Amendment rights of speech, expression, and association and should be withdrawn.

Respectfully submitted,

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