In addition to the theories applied to terrorism, a number of typologies of radical groups have been proposed (e.g., Mozaffari, 1988; Post et al., 2002a, 2002b; Schultz, 1978; Wilkinson, 1986). Schmid and Jongman (2005) summarize much of the work on typologies of terrorism with 10 classes of typologies, each based on the function the typology is meant to serve: actor-, victim-, cause-, environment-, means-, political-orientation-, motivation-, demand-, purpose-, and target-based typologies. As Schmid and Jongman (2005, p. 40) point out, these typologies are of interest to both “antiterrorist ‘firefighters’ and the academic ‘students of combustion,’” and although both would be “served by typologies that could predict future behaviors and events,” typologies are better suited for assisting social scientists in determining what the relationships are between variables than for predicting future events.

1.1 Why Is There No General or Grand Theory of Political Violence/Terrorism?

As with any issue that comes to be multidisciplinary, political violence researchers tend to bring perspectives to their research that reflect the theoretical and methodological traditions of their respective disciplines. Problematic to this multidisciplinary approach for studies of terrorism and political violence, however, is the fact that neither within nor across disciplines has a consensus been found on how to define or conceptualize political violence or terrorism (Gibbs, 1989; Gordon, 2004; Hoffman, 1998; Lizardo, 2008; Ruby, 2002a; Schmid & Jongman, 2005; Silke, 2004b). Furthermore, qualitative evidence suggests that disagreements about how to define terrorism are so deep that researchers cannot even agree on what the parameters of a definition should be (Schmid & Jongman, 2005). It should be no surprise, given the consternation that attempts to define terrorism have drawn, that there is no general theory of political violence or terrorism (Buechler, 1993; Schmid & Jongman, 2005). At least three factors contribute to an absence of a general theory of terrorism. Efforts to study collective and political violence have been largely fragmented and discipline-bound (Davis & Cragin, 2009; Gordon, 2004). A significant proportion of the published research has been by authors with little to no background in the field or familiarity with the extant research. These researchers publish one or two papers on the subject and exit the field

leaving the few dedicated researchers to wade through a continuous supply of material often espousing viewpoints and theories which serious researchers have rejected years ago, as what evidence was available consistently showed such approaches to be fruitless and/or fundamentally wrong (Silke, 2004b, p. 191).

Finally, a plethora of theories have been proposed, but systematic empirical testing of many of them has not followed (Victoroff, 2005).

For our review of the literature, and ultimately in developing our models, we lean toward a broader definition of political violence. Broadly defined, political violence in our literature review includes the numerous ways in which authors from various fields term it, such as group rebellion, civil war, ethnopolitical violence, collective violence, political conflict, insurgency, and terrorism. Recognizing that many scholars, especially in terrorism studies (see Schmid & Jongman, 2005), would disagree with such a broad definition, we argue that doing so enables us to identify indicators that are predictive across a wide range of groups that may turn to violent means to achieve political goals. No claim is being made that our attempt here will result in the general theory of terrorism, but by bridging the existing knowledge from across academic literatures we hope to contribute to such a goal.
1.2 Theories of Political Violence/Terrorism

1.2.1 Relative Deprivation Theory

Drawing on psychology’s frustration-aggression theory (Dollard et al., 1939), relative deprivation (RD) theory posits that large discrepancies between expected and achieved welfare explain large variations in political violence (Gurr, 1970; Snyder, 1978). Prominent in the early 1970s, the theory met mixed results with some evidence supporting it (Muller, 1985; Muller & Seligson, 1987) and other evidence questioning it both conceptually and empirically (Snyder & Tilly, 1972; Weede, 1987). Although RD as a primary predictor of political violence has been largely abandoned by political science and sociology (Brush, 1996), the RD hypothesis continues to be tested (Berrebi, 2007; Drakos & Gofas, 2006; Krueger, 2007). It has been argued, for example, that RD constitutes more than simply economic inequality, and that other forms of deprivation such as “political autonomy, political rights, and social and cultural rights,” contribute to political violence (Dudley & Miller, 1998, p. 78).

1.2.2 Resource Mobilization Theory

Proposed as an alternative to RD theory, resource mobilization (RM) theory argues that economic deprivation alone is insufficient in itself to motivate collective violence (McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Tilly, 1978). Something must mobilize people to collectively act in violent ways. Evidence has been found that suggests that in fact repression, grievances, mobilization, and rebellion are all fundamental components of causal systems (Saxton, 2005). Repression has received much of the attention in the literature (Carey, 2006; Weede, 1987), with the bulk suggesting that there is a nonlinear relationship between repression and political violence (Boswell & Dixon, 1990; Muller, 1985; Ortiz, 2007). Critics, however, caution that data on repressive states may suffer from an underreporting bias (Drakos & Gofas, 2006), and that democracy is too diverse to be operationalized as a single construct (Li, 2005).

1.2.3 Rational Choice and Game Theories

Rational choice (RC) theories/models of political violence come from a diverse body of scholars, such as economists, political scientists, sociologists, and criminologists. Although there is no single rational choice theory (Green & Shapiro, 1994), RC theories share utilitarian roots—actors attempt to maximize benefits and minimize costs in their efforts to achieve a goal. Much of the rational choice work in economics has focused on creating game-theoretic models that explain how changes in policies might change behaviors in predictable ways (Victoroff, 2005). These game-theoretic models have attempted to explain group reactions to government counterterrorism interventions (Enders & Sandler, 2006), decisions to join extreme religious groups (Jannaccone & Berman, 2006), the effect of proactive and deterrence policies (Arce & Sandler, 2005), resource allocation in fighting terrorism (Bier et al., 2007; Powell, 2007), and how potentially rebellious actors make rational decisions in the context of deterrent forces (Epstein, 2002; Klemens et al., in press).

Rational choice perspectives from political science and sociology have also been empirically tested, especially in an attempt to address the shortcomings of relative deprivation and resource mobilization theories. Taking a new perspective to an old problem, RC proponents have reexamined the relationship between deprivation, as well as repression and political violence. Using logged death rates.
between 1973 and 1977 from the *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*, Weede and Muller (1990) examined the inverted U-curve of repression and political violence, finding support for the argument that it is only under semirepressive regimes that the cost-benefit calculation favors political violence. Using data from the *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* from 1968–1977, Muller and Weede (1994, p. 54, example added), found support for the argument that

macroindicators of relative deprivation on the magnitude of rebellious conflict should be conditional on the presence of a structure of political opportunity [e.g., severity of repression] that enhances the expected utility of rebellion.

### 1.2.4 Ethnic Competition Theory

Whether during economic downturns, when (ethnic) out-groups and (dominant) in-groups compete for limited resources, or during times of prosperity when out-groups experience upward mobility into the in-groups’ socioeconomic “space,” ethnic competition theory (EC) argues that inter-ethnic competition for resources results in increased ethnic conflict, protest, and violence (Olzak, 1990, 1992). Competition, both economic and cultural, intensifies as the out-group size increases resulting in an increased sense of out-group threat (Quillian, 1995; Semyonov et al., 2006; Tolksma et al., 2008) and increased opposition to out-group civil rights (Scheepers et al., 2002). Event history analysis of reported xenophobic violence in 444 German counties between 1990 and 1995 was used by Braun and Koopmans (2009) who found a relationship between inter-ethnic violence and the proportion of the population composed of immigrants and the extent to which areas experience immigration. However, this theory is not without critiques. Critics argue that the role labor market competition plays is overestimated, suggesting that rather than competition it is rapid changes to heterogeneous areas (Bergesen & Herman, 1998) and unfamiliarity with and fear of values and cultures (Schneider, 2008) that lead to perceived threat of and violence toward ethnic out-groups.

### 1.2.5 Affect Control Theory

Adopted and refined by others (see review in Heise, 2007), affect control theory (ACT) has its origins in the work of Osgood and colleagues (1957, 1975). The theory argues that culturally shared meanings (fundamental sentiments) inform expectations of events (Heise, 2002). Transient impressions, on the other hand, are created as a result of events taking into account “the setting, the identities involved, and the behaviors involved” (Robinson et al., 1994, p. 177). Inconsistent fundamental sentiments and transient impressions result in deflections, which people attempt minimize to maintain the meanings they have (Robinson et al., 1994; Turner & Stets, 2006). It has been suggested that ACT could be applied to violent subcultures and international interactions—two important components of international terrorism (Heise & Lerner, 2006; Kalkhoff, 2002). Heise and Lerner (2006), using Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPNAB) data from 1971 to 1978 on action-reaction sequences from Middle Eastern nations, found that affectivity was a strong predictor of nation action-reaction behaviors.

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1.2.6 World-Systems Theory

The roots of world-systems theory have developed over the past two centuries across a number of disciplines (see Chil'ot & Hall, 1982). Recent work—theoretical, comparative, and empirical—has undertaken the issue of terrorism, with an emphasis on the role that declining hegemonies play in cycles of terrorism (Bergesen & Lizardo, 2004; Lizardo, 2006, 2008). Put simply, clusters of terrorism occur throughout history as major shifts occur in the world-system—with the current globalization and post-WWII American hegemonic decline as a primary example (Bergesen & Han, 2005; Bergesen & Lizardo, 2004). Evidence on this matter suggests that globalization has both enabling and constraining effects on transnational terrorism. For example, using International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE) data sets that include 112 countries between 1968 and 2000, Li and Schaub (2004) found no evidence of direct effects of economic globalization (trade openness, portfolio investments, and direct foreign investments) on transnational terrorist events, but rather found an indirect negative effect of development (GDP per capita) on those events. Using event count data on attacks on U.S. interests from the U.S. State Department as a dependent variable and measures of economic (Foreign Direct Investment [FDI] and Gross World Product [GWP]) and cultural (number of International Non-Governmental Organizations associated with the U.N.) globalization from an online database maintained by the Global Policy Forum as predictor variables, Lizardo (2006) found that world trade has a constraining effect on transnational terrorist attack on U.S. interests, while the most “predatory” form of globalization (FDI as a percentage of GWP) has an enabling effect on attacks. Furthermore, both of these effects are mediated by cultural globalization, suggesting that the role of economic globalization is more complicated than previous research suggests.

1.2.7 Other Theories and Frameworks

Social learning theory argues that people learn deviant behaviors in much the same way as they learn other behaviors—through reinforcement learning (Ackers, 1973, 2009; Bandura, 1977; Burgess & Ackers, 1966). Although it has received strong empirical support in explaining other deviant behaviors (for review see Ackers & Jensen, 2008), it has only recently been theorized as a way to explain terrorist recruitment and participation (Freiburger & Crane, 2008). No empirical tests applying social learning theory to terrorism have been published to date.

A number of other theories have been proposed to explain terrorism and political violence, some of which have been subsequently dismissed or disproved. Some theories have focused on terrorists or terrorist group leaders as pathological. Early psychopathological theories of terrorism claimed that terrorists were either psychopathic or were plagued by serious mental illness, but there is a lack of empirical evidence to support such a claim (Hudson, 1999; Ruby, 2002b; Victoroff, 2005). Psychological theories which attempt to explain individual level factors associated with political violence have also been theorized. Theories such as identity theory, narcissism theory, paranoia theory, absolutist/apocalyptic theory, cognitive theories, novelty-seeking theory, and humiliation-revenge theory, have been posited, but
these too “are overwhelmingly subjective, speculative...and are not amenable to testing” (Victoroff, 2005, p. 33).

As a final matter we will note that frameworks have been proposed to predict political violence and terrorism. Post et al. (2002a, 2002b) is a primary example. Rather than attempt to explain political violence or some component part of terrorism, as the theories reviewed above do, Post and colleagues attempt to provide indicators that can be used to model a group’s risk for terrorism. Although they offer no particular theoretical perspective, they propose 32 variables, which appear to have roots in some of the theories reviewed above. Those 32 variables fall within one of 4 fields (Post et al., 2002a, p. 75):

1. the historical, cultural, and contextual features that give rise to the group and form the backdrop against which the group operates,
2. the key actors affecting the group,
3. the group itself, including the characteristics, processes, and structures that define it, and
4. the immediate situation confronting the group that can trigger a change in tactics to increasing levels of violence or terrorism.

Problematic to the Post and colleagues framework is that many of the indicators are not operationally defined and some are vaguely worded. Further, some indicators appear unreasonable (e.g., “[t]he observable indicators of risk associated with charismatic leader-follower relationship is: The followers uncritically follow the leader’s directives” (Post et al., 2002a, p. 87).

1.2.8 Challenges to a Predictive Model

A number of challenges must be addressed in developing a model that accurately predicts the occurrence of ethnic- or politically motivated violence. The social sciences have historically relied on self-reported measures for data analysis and modeling. Obtaining information from potentially violent groups for a predictive model of political violence is unrealistic. In addition, as noted above, relying on SMEs is problematic because gathering them frequently to analyze constantly updated information is impractical, it is difficult for them to offer real-time assessments, and their advice is often based on subjective opinion rather than objective analysis. Addressing these challenges requires development of indicators that are objective and observable to outsiders. Recent work has posited a number of such indicators (see McCauley, 2009; Post et al., 2002a, 2002b; Strang, 2005). Results of the few studies that have attempted to test observable indicators appear promising (e.g., Asal et al., 2009).

An ability to use data from objective sources that are easily observable rather than subjective sources that rely on secondary sources of data that are time-consuming to collect makes a prospective model preferable to a tacit judgment model. New data points derived from observable phenomena could be added to the model on an ongoing basis, reducing the time it takes to incorporate new information into predictions. A predictive model developed with empirically supported, theoretically derived variables should allow the model to be applied across the spectrum of politically violent groups. Further model testing and refinement may reveal that the actions of different sub-types of terrorist groups may be most accurately forecasted by different combinations of variables. A model that includes variables derived from theoretical work, as well as variables whose relationship to political violence has been supported by previous empirical research, should produce more accurate forecasts than expert opinions that rely on assumptions that are not supported by data. And, although we are currently unable to do so, in a future
separate class of models, we hope to incorporate agent-based models such as those described in Epstein (2002) and Bobashev et al. (2009).

1.2.9 Limitations of Empirical Theory Testing

It is unfeasible to test several of the theories reviewed above for a variety of reasons—but, to state it in general terms, doing so would violate what makes the current model preferable. Following Heise and Lerner (2006) in testing affect control theory, for example, would require having experts rate large numbers of international behaviors on evaluation, potency, and activity (EPA) scales. Testing social learning theory hypotheses would similarly likely require either SME ratings or self-reports by those actors involved. Frequent gatherings of experts for rating organizational behaviors would be burdensome and impractical for logistical and financial reasons (see Introduction above for more specific reasons). World-systems theory also shows promise in explaining terrorism and political violence, especially the long-term trends that have notably been described (Bergesen & Lizardo, 2004; Lizardo, 2006). Although we believe that these factors could be useful to future versions of our model, they have not been included here because we are concentrating on variables that are available in the Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior (MAROB) data set (described below). Finally, beyond the difficulty of collecting psychological data on terrorists, variables associated with disproved or dismissed theories are omitted simply because inclusion would merely result in model misspecifications.

1.2.10 MAROB Data

Our current effort is focused on analyzing variables from the MAROB data set. We use this data set for several reasons. Noted above, one criticism of previous scholarly work is the reliance on descriptive statistics. Another criticism proffered above is that previous work has been largely discipline-specific. Using the MAROB data set allows us to address both of these criticisms. Predictive statistical modeling will be pursued using variables available in MAROB that are derived from previous theoretical and empirical work from across research disciplines. Although we will not be able to incorporate all of the theories reviewed above, our model will be more inclusive than most previous attempts because we are not limiting it to one or two theoretical frameworks. Another reason we use MAROB is that it allows us to conduct research on historically understudied groups (Silke, 2004b). Undoubtedly this has changed in the years since the September 11, 2001, attacks. Compared with other publicly available data sets, MAROB has the most complete information on a large number of Middle Eastern and North African organizations that may use political violence. On a final note, we study non-U.S.-based organizations because U.S. privacy laws currently prohibit us from studying groups within the United States.

Public data sets that include measures of political violence are available, such as the Global Terrorism Database (1970–1997), the Global Terrorism Database II (1998–2004), and the American Terrorism Study (1980–2002). The MAROB data set shows promise for the modeling of ethnopolitical violence because it includes more than 20 variables associated with political violence including state repression and violence against the organization or its constituents (Abadie, 2006; Weede, 1987), organizational grievances against the state or regime in power (della Porta, 2006; Regan & Norton, 2005),

3 These datasets are available for public use from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) at http://www.icpsr.umiich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/.
support that pushes the organization or pulls it back from violence (Byman et al., 2001; Bynam, 2007), organizational structure and behaviors consistent with propensity for violence (Post et al., 2002a, 2002b), and ideological motivations that increase the likelihood of political violence (Asal et al., 2009), across 118 organizations, representing 22 ethnopolitical groups from 16 Middle Eastern and North African countries over a period of 24 years. Criteria have been established for inclusion in the data set. A detailed explanation of these criteria is provided by Gurr (2000, 2005) and Asal and colleagues (2009). Although the ultimate goal is a parsimonious model with predictive power for a number of political organizations, developing models with data from a number of organizations based in the Middle East and North Africa is a reasonable place to start. Model refinement will be necessary as new organizations are added to MAROB or as other data sets with more diverse organizations become available.

1.2.11 Economic and Political Environment

Politically motivated groups make organizational decisions within the larger contexts in which they act. Important contextual factors affecting an organization’s decisions include the economic conditions in which organizations work, financial and nonfinancial support received, and the degree to which the group or its constituents are repressed. Economic instability is theoretically associated with terrorism (Post, 2002a, 2002b). High-income democratic countries have been found to experience an increased likelihood of terrorist activities during economic contractions (Blomberg et al., 2004). Although evidence from the literature indicates no direct relationship between economic inequality and use of political violence (Borrebi, 2007; Drakos & Gofas, 2006; Krueger, 2007), this finding is not conclusive (Bueno de Mesquita, 2005).

Although inequality has been found by some researchers to be associated with political violence, other evidence supports a repression argument (Muller, 1985; Weede, 1987). It appears that when economic conditions and political unrest, such as repression and state violence against groups, occur together it allows organizations to recruit more educated and qualified members, allowing for more complex and successful violent acts on more important targets (Abadie, 2006; Benmelech et al., 2009; Callaway & Harrelson-Stephenson, 2006; Collins, 2002; Gurr, 1988, 2000; Krueger & Maleckova, 2003; Piazza, 2006). A nonmonotonic relationship, either U- or N- shaped, between repression and political violence is supported by much of the research (Boswell & Dixon, 1990; Muller, 1985; Ortiz, 2007); however, others do argue for a linear relationship (for a short review see Ortiz, 2007).

H1: Organizations will be more likely to use political violence when they or their constituents are repressed, or are the victims of state violence.

Evidence of repression is operationalized with the following MAROB variables: state repression of the organization (STORGREPRESS) and use of violence against the organization (STATEVIOLENCE), the organization is deemed illegal (ORGLEGAL), and the organization operates clandestinely (ORGOPEN).

Involvement in certain political activities is predictive of other organizational behaviors. Asal and colleagues (2009), for example, found support for the argument that organizations that advocate violence will become violent, and organizations that support electoral politics and have a democratic ideology are less likely to move toward violence. These findings suggest that an organization’s values affect the
likelihood that it will become violent. Organizations that believe in democratic systems are less likely to use political violence. Part of exhibiting democratic values is the ability and willingness to negotiate and compromise. Compromise is associated with peaceful resolution of conflicts between states (Mousseau, 1998). It is therefore reasonable to assume that groups that sign agreements with states are less likely to carry out political violence.

It is therefore hypothesized that:

\[ H_2: \text{Groups that espouse democratic values will be less likely to use political violence.} \]
\[ H_3: \text{Groups that sign agreements with states will be less likely to use political violence.} \]

Espousing democratic values is operationalized with the MAROB variable DEMORG.

Compromise and negotiation is operationalized with the MAROB variable ORGIMPL.

### 1.2.12 Grievances

Homogeneous cultural or ethnic groups develop grievances when they see themselves as victims of repression (Crenshaw, 1981; Gurr, 2000; Helmus, 2009; Regan & Norton, 2005). Similarly, at least one of the consequences of political disillusionment is the development of political grievances that lead to a greater likelihood of radicalization and potentially to violent acts (della Porta, 2006). Although there is no direct relationship between economic disparity and organizational violence, economic conditions create an opportunity for groups to coalesce around economic, cultural, and political grievances, especially when the group or its constituents are repressed by the state or are targeted for violence by the state.

This leads to the following hypothesis:

\[ H_4: \text{Grievances formed from economic conditions and policies, as well as from state repression and violence, are related to an increased likelihood that an organization will turn violent.} \]

These are operationalized with MAROB variables: economic grievances (ORGECGR), cultural grievances (ORGCULTGR), and political grievances (ORGPOLGR).

### 1.2.13 Sources of Support

Grievances associated with state repression and violence, and the factors that spur them, alone may not be enough to mobilize groups to use violence. It has been argued, for example, that economic disparity is commonplace and insufficient alone to mobilize collective action (Tilly, 1978). But this disparity may foster grievances toward a state that are an important building block of protest (Linchbach, 1990; Regan & Norton, 2005). Thus, grievances are important in mobilizing participation in and support for collective action (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008). Protest participation is an important sign that there is increased mobilization. It is therefore hypothesized that:

\[ H_5: \text{Protest participation will be associated with political violence.} \]

There are myriad external sources of support that organizations at risk for violence can receive (Paul, 2009). Some forms of support push organizations toward violence and others pull them away from
it in much the same way factors push individuals toward or pull them away from radicalization (Noricks, 2009). Foreign state and diaspora support, including financial and nonfinancial, military and nonmilitary, and political, are all associated with insurgencies and violent organizations (Asal et al., 2009; Byman et al., 2001; Bynam, 2007; Levitt, 2007; Roessler, 2005). On the other hand, states with strong social welfare programs incur less political terrorism (Burgoon, 2006). Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) also support organizations that may be at risk for violence. Support from NGOs can have either push or pull effects, depending on the intent of the support provided. Groups may use restraint in using violence out of concern that using it will result in a withdrawal of humanitarian support (Asal, 2009). On the other hand, NGOs can and do offer financial support to violent groups (Basile, 2004; Mascini, 2006).

Support, then, is a critical component in organizational decisions to use violence. Violence is often used when organizations lack popular support (Asal et al., 2009; Blomberg et al., 2004; Crenshaw, 1981). Support, as noted above, can be domestic or international. The extent to which organizations use violent strategies at home and abroad is likely tied to the sources of support they receive. To that end, the more nonviolent strategies they use the less likely they are to become violent.

It is therefore hypothesized that:

H₆: Receiving foreign state nonmilitary financial support will increase the likelihood of political violence.
H₇: Receiving foreign state nonviolent military support will increase the likelihood of political violence.
H₈: Receiving support from a foreign state will be associated with political violence.
H₉: Receiving political support from a foreign state will be associated with political violence.
H₁₀: Receiving support from a diaspora will increase the likelihood that an organization will use political violence.
H₁₁: The more an organization employees nonviolent strategies of garnering support the less likely it is to become violent.

Support is operationalized using six MAROB variables: support from an international nongovernmental organization (INGOSUP); nonmilitary financial support from a foreign state, such as humanitarian support (FORSTFINSUP); nonviolent military support, such as assistance in buying military supplies (FORTNVMILSUP); whether the organization received support from a foreign state in the past year (FORSTSUP); receiving political support from a foreign state (FORSTPOL); and receiving support from a diaspora (DIASUP). Increased use of nonviolent strategies is operationalized with the MAROB variable ORGLOCMOB.

1.2.14 Structural and Behavioral Indicators

The structure of an organization and the behaviors of the organization and its members are important factors in predicting the likelihood it will become violent. Post and colleagues (2002a, 2002b) posit that political organizations that have strong central organization and those that have factionalized organization are at an increased risk for violence. Some recent evidence seems to support this—splinter groups tend to be more radical than their parent group (Bueno de Mesquita, 2008). Furthermore, Post and
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colleagues theorize that groups whose leaders and members have shown a past capacity for violence may use that tactic for the benefit of the organization. In fact, radicalizing organizations often recruit those who have criminal or antisocial histories (Cronin, 2002). Involvement of those with the ability, experience, or expertise to prepare for and carry out violent acts allows radicalizing groups to form military-style wings (McCauley, 2009; Post et al., 2002a, 2002b; Strang, 2005). And, although the existence within the organization of a military-style wing is not a necessary condition for carrying out violence, it is an indicator of the desire to use force or violence to achieve its goals.

This leads to the following hypotheses:

H12: Style of leadership exhibited by an organization is associated with an increased risk of violence.
H13: Groups that have factionalized are more likely to become violent.
H14: Groups that have intra-group conflict will be more likely to become violent.
H15: Groups that have formed militia wings within the organization are more likely to carry out violent acts.

These hypotheses that are operationalized with the following MAROB variables: leadership style (LEAD), organization has split in the past year (ORGSPLIT), the organization has a military wing (MILITIAFROM), and intra-group conflict (INTRAORGCON).

1.2.15 Ideological Motivations

There is a connection between a group ideology and group political action (Drake, 1998; Johnston et al., 1994). Ideological continuums exist on which groups can fall. A few examples of political ideologies that have been associated with political violence are environmental, right-wing and left-wing, special interest such as abortion, racist, sexist, and religious (Hewitt, 2003; Mahon & Griset, 2008; Schwartz, 1998; Smith, 1994). Although the ideology spectrum is wide, only a few ideologies can be tested with the current data to determine propensity toward violence.

Ideologies that advocate systems that maintain social or economic control are more prone to violence. Patriarchal systems are built around masculinities that advocate violence, conflicts, and wars. Previous research indicates that there is a positive relationship between gender exclusion and group propensity toward violence (Asal et al., 2009). Democracies experience more terrorism than other forms of government (Chenoweth, 2006; Piazza, 2007). This finding has been criticized, however, for ignoring the fact that there is likely an underreporting bias from nondemocratic states (Drakos & Gofas, 2006) and the fact that a variety of democratic states exist (Li, 2005). Democratic states may provide a permissive state in which ideologically extreme groups may develop alongside more centered groups. Extremist groups often compete with one another for a place in the political discourse. And, it is when there is group competition for space in the discourse that ideological groups sometimes become violent (Chenoweth, 2006).

Extreme right parties (ERPs), for example, flourish in democratic states, especially states that are permissive of nontraditional cultural values and states with economic welfare programs (Mudde, 1999).
ERPs are not single-issue parties, but rather generally maintain more than one of the following ideologies: nationalist, xenophobic, racist, homophobic, and conservative economic (Mudde, 2000). Although reestablishing a monocultural state is of primary importance, ERPs also espouse extreme right forms of free markets and anti-welfare state sentiments (Mudde, 1999). It is when there is an intensification of these ideologies that ERPs become violent (Department of Homeland Security, 2009; Wilkinson, 1995).

It is therefore hypothesized that:

H16: Inter-group conflict will be associated with an increased likelihood of violence.

H17: Groups that advocate for a sexist ideology, such as gender exclusion, will be more likely to use political violence.

H18: Groups that advocate for ideologies of traditional economic elites will be more likely to use political violence.

Inter-group competition is operationalized with the MAROB variable INTERORGCON. Sexist ideology is operationalized with the MAROB variable GENDEXC. And, right wing ideology is operationalized using RIGHTORG from the MAROB data set.

1.2.16 Conclusion

The majority of political violence and terrorism work to date has been theoretical, or relied on comparative or descriptive analysis. Qualitative work has provided ample description of politically violent groups and experts have posited indicators or variables that predict violence, but little empirical work has been done to test the validity of these measures. Furthermore, gathering SMEs to provide expert advice is impractical given how quickly organizations can act. A model consisting of 24 variables supported by the existing literature, that predicts organization propensity for violence, is proposed. These variables include measures of the extent to which groups and their constituents are victims of state repression and violence, organizations have coalesced around grievances, organizations receive support that pushes them toward or pulls them away from violence, organizations and their members have shown a propensity for violence in the past, organizations are structured for violence, and organizations have ideological motivations that move them toward violence. It is critical to the accuracy of the proposed model that as new evidence emerges in the literature, new data sources become available, and the current model is tested, necessary modifications are made. Variables that lack predictive power may be removed and the predictive power of new variables tested as data to test them become available.
2. References


