This section provides an overview of the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG), Version 1. The VVSG was created in response to the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002 and is based on the initial set of recommendations of the Technical Guidelines Development Committee (TGDC) mandated by HAVA. The VVSG Version 1 augments the Voting Systems Standard (VSS) of 2002 (VSS-2002), which was promulgated by the Federal Election Commission (FEC). This overview serves as an explanation of how the VVSG Version 1 differs from the VSS-2002 and provides a basis for further improvements. In addition, it provides a high level overview of the major sections of the two volumes that make up VVSG Version 1.

Document Structure

This document presents the voluntary voting system guidelines as a single document consisting of two volumes: Volume I, the performance provisions of the guidelines and Volume II, the testing specification. Sections of this document augment the VSS-2002, by either replacing VSS-2002 sections or adding new sections. New material is indicated by distinct header information on each page. The header information is in a gray shaded box and includes the words “NEW MATERIAL”. The footer information also includes the words “NEW MATERIAL”. Additionally, line numbers have been added to these pages.

In the new sections that contain requirements or informative characteristics, each requirement or characteristic is numbered according to a hierarchical scheme in which higher-level requirements (such as “provide accessibility for blind voters”) are supported by lower level requirements (“provide an audio-tactile interface”). These sections are: Sections 2.2.7, 6.0.1, 6.0.2, 6.0.3, 6.0.4, and Appendix D. Additionally, each requirement or characteristic indicates to whom it applies (i.e., responsible entity) as well as which stage of the voting process (i.e., pre-voting, voting, post-voting) is affected. There are three responsible entities: voting system vendor (V), testing authority (T), and repository (R). To aid the reader, a colored box with the first letter of the responsible entity, i.e., V, T, or R accompanies the name of the entity, as follows:

Voting System Vendor

Testing Authority

Repository

The three stages of the voting process are indicated by a presenting a box with all three stages and using a strikeout font to indicate the stages that are not applicable, as follows:

Pre-Voting  Voting Post-Voting

Indicates the pre-voting stage is the only stage that applies.
Pre-Voting  Voting Post-Voting

Indicates all three stages apply.

Background

The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) established the Technical Guidelines Development Committee to assist the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) with the development of voluntary voting system guidelines. HAVA directs the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to chair the TGDC and to provide technical support to the TGDC in the development of these guidelines. The TGDC’s initial set of recommendations for these guidelines were presented to the Election Assistance Commission in May.

Brief History of Voting Systems Standards and Guidelines

In 1975, the National Bureau of Standards (now the National Institute of Standards and Technology) and the Office of the Federal Elections (the Office of Election Administration’s predecessor at the General Accounting Office) produced a joint report, Effective Use of Computing Technology in Vote Tallying. This report concluded that a basic cause of computer-related election problems was the lack of appropriate technical skills at the state and local level to develop or implement sophisticated Standards against which voting system hardware and software could be tested. A subsequent Congressionally-authorized study produced by the FEC and the National Bureau of Standards detailed the need for a federal agency to develop national performance Standards that could be used as a tool by state and local election officials in the testing, certification, and procurement of computer-based voting systems.

In 1984, Congress appropriated funds for the FEC to develop voluntary national Standards for computer-based voting systems. The FEC formally approved the Performance and Test Standards for Punchcard, Marksense and Direct Recording Electronic Voting Systems in January 1990.

Voter Verified Paper Audit Trails

The VSS-2002 contained no requirements for voter verified paper audit trails. The VVSG Version 1 is providing requirements for voter verified paper audit trails (VVPAT) so that States that choose to implement VVPAT or States that are considering implementation can utilize these requirements to help ensure the effective operation of these systems. The EAC, TGDC, and NIST are taking no position with respect to the
implementation of VVPAT systems and are neither requiring nor endorsing voter verified paper audit trails. Methods other than VVPAT can provide ways to achieve independent dual verification. These other methods are described in the Security Overview.

Wireless Technology

The TGDC concluded that the use of wireless technology introduces risk and should be approached with caution. Therefore, the VVSG Version 1 includes a new section on wireless that augments the general telecommunications requirements in Volume 1, Section 5. in Section 5. The VVSG Version 1 requires that wireless transmissions be encrypted to protect against a variety of security problems.

Software Distribution and Setup Validation

The VSS-2002 contains many requirements to help voting officials validate the software and the setup of voting system software and hardware. Subsequent to the publication of the VSS-2002, the EAC invited all voting software vendors to submit their software to a national software repository maintained by NIST. This section of the VVSG Version 1 builds on the VSS-2002 use of this repository and other validation mechanisms.

Glossary

This glossary contains terms from the VSS-2002 as well as the inclusion of additional terms needed to understand voting and related areas such as security, human factors, and testing. Each term includes a definition and its source as well as an association as to the domain for which the term applies. Having a common set of forms the basis for understanding requirements and for discussing improvements. The glossary is also available in a web-based on-line version at http://www.nist.gov/votingglossary.

Error Rates

Volume II, Appendix C addresses error rates. This appendix contains revised procedures to test that systems meet the indicated error rates. These apply to errors the system, defined as a ballot position error rate, and not by a voter's action. Further research on human interface and usability issues is needed to enable the development of Standards for error rates that account for human error.

There were concerns about the VSS-2002 Appendix regarding the numbers listed in the probability ratio sequential test (PRST) of the Mean Time Before Failure (MTBF) that (1) the numbers do not correspond to the numbers for the same table in the 1990 VSS,
even though the stated assumptions do not change, and (2) the numbers from neither the 1990 nor the 2002 tables correspond to numbers that would result from standard PRST formulas listed in standard references such as the military handbook MIL-HDBK-781A. To address these concerns, the revised Appendix has replaced the numbers in the table with those that would indicated by the truncated PRST design from MIL-HDBK-781A with the corresponding parameters and made it more clear in the text that a truncated design was chosen. Using standard theoretical formulas leads to somewhat different numbers, but the revised Appendix C uses numbers from the MIL-HDBK-781A because they may be considered more standard and produce a less drastic change. Also, in the 1990 VSS, there was an appendix devoted to the definition and use of “partial failures.” This appendix was eliminated from the VSS-2002. The new version eliminated the paragraph and diagram in Appendix C that used partial failures.

The new version also includes statements reminding users to be cognizant of the assumptions involved in tests that use time-based exponential failure times and constant failure rates. Given the concerns that have been stated about appropriate testing times, note that the given table is appropriate only for the stated parameters, and that officials should assess the appropriateness of whatever parameters are used in testing.

Best Practices for Voting Officials

The VSS-2002 contained requirements for voting systems and for testing entities. However, requirements for human factors, wireless communications, VVPAT, software distribution and setup validation depend not only on voting systems providing specific capabilities but on voting officials developing and carrying out appropriate procedures. Consequently, the VVSG Version 1 contains Best Practices for voting officials. The new sections in VVSG Version 1 define each requirement as pertaining to voting systems, vendor repository, or test authorities, or voting officials. The requirements for voting officials are collected in Appendix C of Volume 1. (Appendix C had previously been Usability.)

Voting Process

The VSS-2002 defined three major stages of voting: pre-voting, voting, and post-voting. The stage for each requirement is marked in the new sections. The VVSG Version 2 will have a more detailed voting process model and will allow for finer granularity.

Summary of Content of Volume I

Volume I contains performance standards for electronic components of voting systems. In addition to containing a glossary (Appendix A), applicable references (Appendix B), Best Practices (Appendix C) and Security Overview (Appendix D). Volume I is divided into nine sections:

Section 1- Introduction: This section provides an introduction to the Standards, addressing the following topics:
• Objectives and usage of the Standards,
• Development history for initial Standards,
• Update of the Standards,
• Accessibility for individuals with disabilities,
• Definitions of key terms,
• Application of the Standards and test specifications,
• Conformance clause, and
• Outline of contents.

Section 2 - Functional Capabilities: This section contains Standards detailing the functional capabilities required of a voting system. This section sets out precisely what it is that a voting system is required to do. This section also sets forth the minimum actions a voting system must be able to perform to be eligible for qualification. For organizational purposes, functional capabilities are categorized by the phase of election activity in which they are required:
• Overall Capabilities: These functional capabilities apply throughout the election process. They include security, accuracy, integrity, system auditability, election management system, vote tabulation, ballot counters, telecommunications, and data retention.
• Pre-voting Capabilities: These functional capabilities are used to prepare the voting system for voting. They include ballot preparation, the preparation of election-specific software (including firmware), the production of ballots or ballot pages, the installation of ballots and ballot counting software (including firmware), and system and equipment tests.
• Voting Capabilities: These functional capabilities include all operations conducted at the polling place by voters and officials including the generation of status messages.
• Post-voting Capabilities: These functional capabilities apply after all votes have been cast. They include closing the polling place; obtaining reports by voting machine, polling place, and precinct; obtaining consolidated reports; and obtaining reports of audit trails.
• Maintenance, Transportation and Storage Capabilities: These capabilities are necessary to maintain, transport, and store voting system equipment.

For each functional capability, common standards are specified. In recognition of the diversity of voting systems, some of the standards have additional requirements that apply only if the system incorporates certain functions (for example, voting systems employing telecommunications to transmit voting data) or configurations (for example, a central count component). Where system-specific standards are appropriate, common
standards are followed by standards applicable to specific technologies (i.e., paper-based or DRE) or intended use (i.e., central or precinct count).

Section 3 - Hardware Standards: This section describes the performance requirements, physical characteristics, and design, construction, and maintenance characteristics of the hardware and related components of a voting system. This section focuses on a broad range of devices used in the design and manufacture of voting systems, such as:

- For paper ballots: printers, cards, boxes, transfer boxes, and readers,
- For electronic systems: ballot displays, ballot recorders, precinct vote control units,
- For voting devices: punching and marking devices and electronic recording devices,
- Voting booths and enclosures,
- Equipment used to prepare ballots, program elections, consolidate and report votes, and perform other elections management activities,
- Fixed servers and removable electronic data storage media, and
- Printers.

The Standards specify the minimum values for the relevant attributes of hardware, such as:

- Accuracy,
- Reliability,
- Stability under normal environmental operating conditions and when equipment is in storage and transit,
- Power requirements and ability to respond to interruptions of power supply,
- Susceptibility to interference from static electricity and magnetic fields,
- Product marking, and
- Safety.

Section 4 - Software Standards: This section describes the design and performance characteristics of the software embodied in voting systems, addressing both system level software and voting system application software. The requirements of this section are intended to ensure that the overall objectives of accuracy, logical correctness, privacy, system integrity, and reliability are achieved. Although this section emphasizes software, the software standards may influence hardware design in some voting systems.

The requirements of this section apply to all software developed for use in voting systems, including:

- Software provided by the voting system vendor and its component suppliers, and
- Software furnished by an external provider where the software is potentially used in any way during voting system operation.

The general standards in this section apply to software used to support the broad range of voting system activities, including pre-voting, voting and post-voting activities. System specific Standards are defined for ballot counting, vote processing, the creation of an unalterable audit trail, and the generation of output reports and files. Voting system software is also subject to the security requirements of Section 6.
Section 5 - Telecommunications Standards: This section describes the requirements for the telecommunications components of voting systems. Additionally, it defines the acceptable levels of performance against these characteristics. For the purpose of the Standards, telecommunications is defined as the capability to transmit and receive data electronically regardless of whether the transmission is localized within the polling place or the data is transmitted to a geographically distinct location. The requirements in this section represent functional and performance requirements for the transmission of data that are used to operate the system and report official election results. Where applicable, this section specifies minimum values for critical performance and functional attributes involving telecommunications hardware and software components. This section addresses telecommunications hardware and software across a broad range of technologies such as dial-up communications technologies, high-speed telecommunications lines (public and private), cabling technologies, communications routers, modems, modem drivers, channel service units (CSU)/data service units (DSU), and dial-up networking applications software.

Additionally, this section applies to voting-related transmissions over public networks, such as those provided by regional telephone companies and long distance carriers. This section also applies to private networks regardless of whether the network is owned and operated by the election jurisdiction. For systems that transmit data over public networks, this section applies to telecommunications components installed and operated at settings supervised by election officials, such as polling places or central offices.

Section 6 - Security Standards: This section starts with an overview that provides a description of a new approach to securing voting systems called independent dual verification. The overview introduces the concept of independent dual verification and explains several approaches for achieving it. Appendix D further explores independent dual verification. Independent dual verification is not required in VVSG Version 1, but will be required in Version 2. Following the overview are 3 new sections describing requirements for voter verified paper audit trails, wireless technology and software distribution and setup. The remainder of the section is unchanged from VSS-2002 and describes the security capabilities for a voting system, encompassing the system’s hardware, software, communications, and documentation. The requirements of this section recognize that no predefined set of security Standards will address and defeat all conceivable or theoretical threats. However, the Standards articulate requirements to achieve acceptable levels of integrity, reliability, and inviolability. Ultimately, the objectives of the security Standards for voting systems are to:

• Establish and maintain controls that can ensure that accidents, inadvertent mistakes, and errors are minimized,
• Protect the system from intentional manipulation and fraud,
• Protect the system from malicious mischief,
• Identify fraudulent or erroneous changes to the system, and
• Protect secrecy in the voting process.

These Standards are intended to address a broad range of risks to the integrity of a voting system. While it is not possible to identify all potential risks, the Standards identify several types of risk that must be addressed, including:
Unauthorized changes to system capabilities for defining ballot formats, casting and recording votes, calculating vote totals consistent with defined ballot formats, and reporting vote totals,
- Alteration of voting system audit trails,
- Altering a legitimately cast vote,
- Preventing the recording of a legitimately cast vote,
- Introducing data for a vote not cast by a registered voter,
- Changing calculated vote totals,
- Preventing access to vote data, including individual votes and vote totals, to unauthorized individuals, and
- Preventing access to voter identification data and data for votes cast by the voter such that an individual can determine the content of specific votes cast by the voter.

Section 7 - Quality Assurance: In the Standards, quality assurance is a vendor function with associated practices that confirms throughout the system development and maintenance life-cycle that a voting system conforms with the Standards and other requirements of state and local jurisdictions. Quality assurance focuses on building quality into a system and reducing dependence on system tests at the end of the life-cycle to detect deficiencies.

This section describes the responsibilities of the voting system vendor for designing and implementing a quality assurance program to ensure that the design, workmanship, and performance requirements of the Standards are achieved in all delivered systems and components. These responsibilities include:
- Development of procedures for identifying and procuring parts and raw materials of the requisite quality, and for their inspection, acceptance, and control.
- Documentation of hardware and software development processes.
- Identification and enforcement of all requirements for in-process inspection and testing that the manufacturer deems necessary to ensure proper fabrication and assembly of hardware, as well as installation and operation of software or firmware.
- Procedures for maintaining all data and records required to document and verify the quality inspections and tests.

Section 8 - Configuration Management: This section contains specific requirements for configuration management of voting systems. For the purposes of the Standards, configuration management is defined as a set of activities and associated practices that assures full knowledge and control of the components of a system, beginning with its initial development, progressing throughout its development and construction, and continuing with its ongoing maintenance and enhancement. This section describes activities in terms of their purpose and outcomes. It does not describe specific procedures or steps to be employed to accomplish them—these are left to the vendor to select.

The requirements of this section address a broad set of record keeping, audit, and reporting activities that include:

- Identifying discrete system components,
- Creating records of formal baselines of all components,
• Controlling changes made to the system and its components,
• Submitting new versions of the system to Independent Test Authorities (ITA)s,
• Releasing new versions of the system to customers,
• Auditing the system, including its documentation, against configuration management records,
• Controlling interfaces to other systems, and
• Identifying tools used to build and maintain the system.

Vendors are required to submit documentation of these procedures to the ITA as part of the Technical Data Package for system qualification testing. Additionally, as articulated in state or local election laws, regulations, or contractual agreements with vendors, authorized election officials or their representatives reserve the right to inspect vendor facilities and operations to determine conformance with the vendor’s reported configuration management procedures.

Section 9 - Overview of Qualification Tests: This section provides an overview for the qualification testing of voting systems. Qualification testing is the process by which a voting system is shown to comply with the requirements of the Standards and the requirements of its own design and performance specifications. The testing also evaluates the completeness of the vendor's developmental test program, including the sufficiency of vendor tests conducted to demonstrate compliance with stated system design and performance specifications, and the vendor’s documented quality assurance and configuration management practices.

The qualification test process is intended to discover errors that, should they occur in actual election use, could result in failure to complete election operations in a satisfactory manner. This section describes the scope of qualification testing, its applicability to voting system components, documentation that must be submitted by the vendor, and the flow of the test process. This section also describes differences between the test process for initial qualification testing of a system and the testing for modifications and re-qualification after a qualified system has been modified.

Since 1994, the testing described in this section has been performed by an ITA that is certified by NASED. For the future, HAVA provides for EAC-accredited testing authorities.

• Absolute correctness of all ballot processing software, for which no margin for error exists,
Operational accuracy in the recording and processing of voting data, as measured by the error rate articulated in Volume I, Section 3,
Operational failure or the number of unrecoverable failures under conditions simulating the intended storage, operation, transportation, and maintenance environments for voting systems, using an actual time-based period of processing test ballots,
System performance and function under normal and abnormal conditions, and
Completeness and accuracy of the system documentation and configuration management records to enable purchasing jurisdictions to effectively install, test, and operate the system.

Summary of Volume II Content

Section 1 - Introduction: This section provides an overview of Volume II, addressing the following topics:

- Objectives of Volume II,
- General contents of Volume II,
- Qualification testing focus,
- Qualification testing sequence,
- Evolution of testing, and
- Outline of contents.

Section 2 - Technical Data Package: This section contains a description of vendor documentation relating to the voting system that shall be submitted with the system as a precondition for qualification testing. These items are necessary to define the product and its method of operation; to provide the vendor’s technical and test data supporting its claims of the system's functional capabilities and performance levels; and to document instructions and procedures governing system operation and field maintenance.

The content of the Technical Data Package (TDP) shall contain a complete description of the following information about the system:

- Overall system design, including subsystems, modules, and interfaces,
- Specific functional capabilities,
- Performance and design specifications,
- Design constraints and compatibility requirements,
- Personnel, equipment, and facilities necessary for system operation, maintenance, and logistical support,
- Vendor practices for assuring system quality during the system’s development and subsequent maintenance, and
- Vendor practices for managing the configuration of the system during development and for modifications to the system throughout its life-cycle.

Section 3 - Functionality Testing: This section contains a description of the testing to be performed by the ITA to confirm the functional capabilities of a voting system submitted for qualification testing. It describes the scope and basis for functional testing, the general sequence of tests within the overall test process, and provides guidance on testing
for accessibility. It also discusses testing of functionality of systems that operate on personal computers.

Section 4 - Hardware Testing: This section contains a description of the testing to be performed by the ITAs to confirm the proper functioning of the hardware components of a voting system submitted for qualification testing. This section requires ITAs to design and perform procedures that test the voting system hardware for both operating and non-operating environmental tests.

Hardware testing begins with non-operating tests that require the use of an environmental test facility. These are followed by operating tests that are performed partly in an environmental facility and partly in a standard test laboratory or shop environment. The non-operating tests are intended to evaluate the ability of the system hardware to withstand exposure to various environmental conditions incidental to voting system storage, maintenance, and transportation. The procedures are based on test methods contained in Military Standards (MIL-STD) 810D, modified where appropriate, and include such tests as: bench handling, vibration, low and high temperature, and humidity.

The operating tests involve running the system for an extended period of time under varying temperatures and voltages. This ensures that the hardware meets or exceeds the minimum requirements for reliability, data reading, and processing accuracy contained in Section 3 of Volume I. Although the procedure emphasizes equipment operability and data accuracy, it is not an exhaustive evaluation of all system functions. Moreover, the severity of the test conditions has in most cases been reduced from that specified in the Military Standards to reflect commercial, rather than military, practice.

Section 5 - Software Testing: This section contains a description of the testing to be performed by the ITAs to confirm the proper functioning of the software components of a voting system submitted for qualification testing. It describes the scope and basis for software testing, the initial review of documentation to support software testing, and the review of voting system source code.

The software qualification tests encompass a number of interrelated examinations. The examinations include selective review of source code for conformance with the vendor’s stated standards, and other system documentation provided by the vendor. The code inspection is complemented by a series of functional tests to verify the proper performance of all system functions controlled by the software.

Section 6 - System Level Integration Testing: This section contains a description of the testing conducted by the ITAs to confirm the proper functioning of the fully integrated components of a voting system submitted for qualification testing. It describes the scope and basis for integration testing, testing of internal and external system interfaces, testing of security capabilities, testing of accessibility features, and the configuration audits, including the evaluation of claims made in the system documentation.

System-level qualification tests address the integrated operation of hardware, software and telecommunications capabilities (where applicable) to assess the system’s
response to a range of both normal and abnormal conditions in an attempt to compromise the system.

Section 7 - Examination of Vendor Practices for Configuration Management and Quality Assurance: This section contains a description of examinations conducted by the ITAs to evaluate the extent to which vendors meet the requirements for configuration management and quality assurance. It describes the scope and basis for the examinations and the general sequence of the examinations. It also provides guidance on the substantive focus of the examinations.

In reviewing configuration management practices, the ITAs examine the vendor’s:

- configuration management policy,
- configuration identification policy,
- baseline, promotion and demotion procedures,
- configuration control procedures,
- release process and procedures, and
- configuration audit procedures.

In reviewing quality assurance practices, the ITAs examine the vendor’s:

- quality assurance policy,
- parts and materials tests and examinations,
- quality conformance plans, procedures and inspection results, and
- voting system documentation.